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INNOVATIVE FINANCING AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM GLOBAL HEALTH
David Gartner†
Abstract: The growth of innovative financing for development over the last
decade has demonstrated the enormous potential of new mechanisms for generating
resources beyond traditional official development assistance. In the global health sector,
diverse innovative finance institutions provide a window into the relative merits of
approaches that rely on taxation, bonds, and advanced contract arrangements. The
experience of IFFIm, UNITAID, and the AMC offer broader insights into the importance
of sustainability and participation in ensuring the success of innovative finance
mechanisms, as well as the potential for innovative financing to contribute to realizing
the Sustainable Development Goals. The most successful of these innovative
mechanisms are generally the most automatic in terms of financing and the most
participatory in terms of governance. More participatory approaches to designing and
governing innovative financing seem to foster better outcomes in terms of the ultimate
market impact of these financing mechanisms.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”) catalyzed a dramatic
era of innovation in financing global health and development. With the
launch of the Sustainable Development Goals (“SDGs”) in 2015, the
challenges of financing will be even greater, and drawing valuable lessons
from the past decade of experience with innovative financing mechanisms
will be especially crucial. Preliminary estimates suggest that achieving the
SDGs could cost somewhere between USD 2 and USD 3 trillion dollars.1
While much of these resources will come from domestic resource
mobilization and private financing, some thirty countries around the world
will likely require substantial development assistance in order to achieve the
goals.2 Innovative financing could be an important enabler of success for a
much wider range of countries. Over the last decade, innovative approaches
†
Professor of Law at Arizona State University, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law. J.D. Yale
Law School, Ph.D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Thanks to Carlos Cuevas, Philipp Dann, Tim
Buthe, Amanda Glassman, Benedict Kingsbury, and Anita Ramasastry for all their helpful suggestions and
comments and to all of the participants in the University of Washington Symposium on the Post-2015
Development Agenda, the Duke University Workshop in Political Institutions, Behavior, and Identities, and
the Innovations in Governance of Development Finance Conference at New York University.
1
See U.N. System Task Team (UNTT), Working Group on Sustainable Development Financing,
Financing for Sustainable Development: Review of Global Investment Requirements and Estimates
(2014), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/2096Chapter%201global%20investment
%20requirement%20estimates.pdf.
2
See HOMI KHARAS, ANNALISA PRIZZER & ANDREW ROGERSON, OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT
INSTITUTE, FINANCING THE POST-2015 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS: A ROUGH ROAD MAP 7 (2014),
available at http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9374.pdf.
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to development financing have become increasingly important and much of
this experimentation has been in the global health sector. Estimates of the
scale of innovative finance reveal a tenfold increase in non-traditional flows
of development assistance, and the World Bank calculates that the flow
reached a total of USD 57.1 billion between 2000 and 2008.3
Innovative approaches to global health financing offer a unique
window into the relative merits of mechanisms that rely on taxation, bonds,
and advanced contracting arrangements. While these efforts share common
inspiration in realizing the MDGs, the involvement of a range of different
state and non-state actors has fostered distinct governance structures and
approaches. While most of these mechanisms have generated additional
resources, some have also created substantial future liabilities. The more
participatory examples of these innovative finance mechanisms have
aggressively sought to reshape relevant markets for essential medicines and
vaccines while others have undertaken a more limited mandate.
Innovative finance became a central feature of development debates in
the wake of the Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development in
2002, as many G8 countries sought to contribute to achieve the MDGs while
limiting the overall domestic budgetary cost. At Monterrey, countries agreed
“to study, in the appropriate forums, the results of the analysis requested
from the Secretary General on possible innovative sources of finance.”4 At
the 2005 UN World Summit to review progress on the MDGs, seventy-nine
countries issued a Declaration on Innovative Sources of Financing,
reflecting an evolved sophistication of thinking about the issue.5 Among
other developments, the Summit catalyzed the launch of innovative
financing mechanisms such as UNITAID. 6 In 2008, the United Nations
established a High Level Taskforce on Innovative Financing for Health
Systems to build on the experience of first generation innovative financing
efforts. 7 The Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-Moon,
appointed former French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy as the
Secretary General’s special advisor on innovative financing for
3

See Navin Girishankar, Innovating Development Finance: From Financing Sources to Financial
Solutions 8 (Concessional Fin. & Global Partnerships, Working Paper Series No. 1, 2009).
4
International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey, Mex., Mar. 18-22, 2002,
Monterrey Consensus, ¶44, U.N. DOC. A/CONF.198/11 (2003).
5
Elisabeth Sandor, Simon Scott & Julia Benn, Innovative Financing to Fund Development
Progress and Prospects, OECD DEV. CO-OPERATION DIRECTORATE ISSUES BRIEF 1, 2 (Nov. 2009),
http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/44087344.pdf.
6
John Langmore, Innovative Sources of Development Finance, DEVPOLICY BLOG (Dec. 16, 2011),
http://devpolicy.org/innovative-sources-of-development-finance20111216/.
7
See David McCoy & Nouria Brikci, Taskforce on Innovative International Financing for Health
Systems: What Next?, 88 BULL. OF THE WHO 478 (2010).
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development.8 By 2012, about twenty different countries had established or
actively participated in at least one innovative financing mechanism. 9
Amidst dramatic innovation within development finance, a growing
number of scholars have sought to re-conceptualize the interaction between
public and private actors and the important role of innovative governance
within these institutions.10 Some scholars have suggested that literature on
the accountability of international institutions should be applied to analyzing
the structures of development financing. 11 Others have pointed out that
traditionally sharp distinctions between the areas of public and private law
are not helpful in analyzing the rapidly evolving area of development
finance.12 Hybrid frameworks, which involve public and private actors in
governance and catalyze both public and private resources, are central to the
innovative financing mechanisms that have emerged in recent years.
Scholars focused on the governance of international institutions are
becoming increasingly interested in the role of non-state actors alongside
states within these institutions. Some of this work focuses on the role of
non-governmental organizations,13 while other work highlights the growing
role of foundations and corporations, as well as the influence of bureaucrats
within these institutions.14 Amidst growing interest in explaining the causes
of participation by these diverse stakeholders, 15 there remains somewhat
limited analysis of the consequences of such participation. At the same
time, scholarly interest in the relationships and interactions between
different international institutions is growing. Recent work highlights how
new institutions challenge existing ones in the context of “contested
8
Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General Appoints Philippe Douste-Blazy of
France as Special Adviser on Innovative Financing for Development, U.N. Press Release SG/A/1119BIO/3962-DEV/2659 (February 18, 2008).
9
Peer Review of Existing Innovative Financings for Development, LEADING GRP. ON INNOVATIVE
FIN. FOR DEV. (June 12, 2013), http://leadinggroup.org/IMG/pdf/Mapping_FIDENG-3.pdf.
10
See Kevin Davis, Financing Development as a Field of Practice, Study and Innovation (NYU
Institute for International Law & Justice, Working Paper no. 2008/2010, 2008).
11
See Robert Keohane & Ruth Grant, Accountability and Abuses in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 29 (2005) (defining accountability as “the right to hold other actors to a set of standards to judge
whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities to these standards, and to impose sanctions if they
determine these responsibilities have not been met”); Philipp Dann, Accountability in Development Aid
Law: The World Bank, UNDP, and Emerging Structures of Transnational Oversight, 44 ARCHIV DES
VÖLKERRECHTS 381 (2006).
12
See Davis, supra note 10.
13
See David Gartner, Beyond the Monopoly of States, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 595 (2010).
14
See Tana Johnson & Johannes Urpelainen, International Bureaucrats and the Formation of
Intergovernmental Organizations: Institutional Design Discretion Sweetens the Pot, 68 INT’L ORG. 177
(2014).
15
See Kenneth W. Abbott & David Gartner, Reimagining Participation in International Institutions,
8 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 1 (2012).
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multilateralism,” 16 how international institutions shape action through
“orchestration,” 17 and how existing international institutions contribute to
the birth of new institutions.18 Yet relatively few scholars have analyzed the
symbiotic relationship between the financing and implementing institutions.
This article examines the causes of institutional variation within the realm of
innovative global health financing and highlights the significance of
participation by non-state actors in the governance of these institutions for
shaping market reform.
This article examines three different innovative financing mechanisms
that emerged after 2005: The International Financial Facility for
Immunizations (“IFFIm”), UNITAID, and the Advanced Market
Commitment (“AMC”) initiative. A single G8 country championed each of
these innovative financing mechanisms and ultimately the entire G8
endorsed them to accelerate progress toward achieving the Millennium
Development Goals. Yet each mechanism relied upon a different financial
instrument: bonds in the case of IFFIm, taxation in the case of UNITAID,
and long-term contracts in the case of the AMC. Despite their common
inspiration, each utilized different approaches for their initial design and
adopted distinct governance structures. These early decisions on the design
and governance of these financing mechanisms had important implications
for the evolution and ultimate success of each mechanism. Part II examines
the emergence of these three innovative financing mechanisms. Part III
analyzes the factors that shaped the design and success of each model. Part
IV explores the implications of these mechanisms for efforts to achieve the
Sustainable Development Goals and analyzes which structures and models
of innovative financing hold the greatest promise for the future.
II.

INNOVATIVE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

A.

International Finance Facility for Immunizations

The International Finance Facility for Immunizations was launched in
2006 by six donor governments as a mechanism to front-load assistance for
global health. The original six donors, the United Kingdom, France, Spain,
Sweden, and Norway, used legally binding commitments of overseas
development assistance (“ODA”) to issue bonds on international capital
16

See Julie Morse & Robert Keohane, Contested Multilateralism, 9(4) REV. INT’L ORG. 385 (2014).
See Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through
Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501
(2009).
18
See Johnson, supra note 14.
17
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markets, repayable over periods of up to twenty years.19 Between 2006 and
2014, IFFIm issued bonds in five different markets and raised USD 5
billion.20 An evaluation of IFFIm’s impact estimated that by 2011, these
investments averted between 1.3 million and 2.08 million deaths.21
The International Finance Facility (“IFF”) was an idea that was
initially championed by Gordon Brown of the United Kingdom (then
Chancellor of the Exchequer) as a hybrid approach to combining both public
and private sources of development finance. Inspired by the UN Millennium
Summit of 2000, Brown put forward the idea of a large-scale IFF for
achieving the MDGs. 22 By November 2004, the United Kingdom and
France announced their shared commitment to launch a smaller scale version
of the IFF focused on immunizations in partnership with the Global Alliance
for Vaccines and Immunizations (“GAVI”).23
At the 2005 World Summit, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain,
and Sweden committed nearly USD 4 billion to scale-up the work of GAVI
through the IFFIm. Along with the founding donors, ten countries have so
far contributed to IFFIm, including Norway, Brazil, South Africa, and Japan.
However, the United Kingdom and France account for nearly three quarters
of the total amount pledged by donors to IFFIm.24
IFFIm quickly transformed the capacity of GAVI with the initial USD
1.2 billion raised, which allowed its vaccination programs to expand rapidly.
Since its inception in 2006, IFFIm has raised USD 5 billion and provided the
majority of overall financing to GAVI. 25 Although IFFIm provides a net
increase in funding in the short-to-medium term for GAVI, its approach
means that the cost of servicing IFFIm bonds is currently greater than the
resources that IFFIm generates for GAVI, and this negative balance will
increase over the next decade.26
IFFIm operates as a charitable company based within the United
Kingdom, with a board consisting of seven individuals with strong
experience either in the finance industry or in financial regulation. Although
19

Origins of IFFIm, IFFIM, http://www.iffim.org/about/origins-of-iffim/ (last visited May 16, 2015).
Donors, IFFIM, http://www.iffim.org/donors/ (last visited May 16, 2015).
MARK PEARSON ET AL., HEALTH & LIFE SCIENCES PARTNERSHIP, EVALUATION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL FACILITY FOR IMMUNISATION 26 (2011).
22
See Todd Moss, Ten Myths of the International Finance Facility 3 (Ctr. for Global Development
Working Paper No. 60, 2005).
23
Origins of IFFIm, IFFIM, http://www.iffim.org/about/origins-of-iffim/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2015).
24
Donor Profiles - United Kingdom, GAVI, http://www.gavi.org/funding/donor-profiles/unitedkingdom/ (last visited May 15, 2015); Donor Profiles - France, GAVI, http://www.gavi.org/funding/donorprofiles/france/ (last visited May 15, 2015).
25
Donors, supra note 20.
26
See U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Economic Report and Social Survey:
In Search of New Development Finance, U.N. Doc. E/2012/50/Rev. 1 (2012).
20
21
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several of these board members have some background in either health or
development, the relevant expertise of each is primarily in the finance arena.
The board reviews funding requests by the GAVI immunization program,
oversees IFFIm’s governance and policies, and monitors its investment
portfolio and efficacy. 27 In contrast, the board of GAVI includes donor
country governments, recipient country governments, foundation
representatives, industry representatives, NGO representatives, and select
individuals. 28 While the IFFIm board periodically updates the GAVI
secretariat, the GAVI board does not have any formal oversight authority
over IFFIm.29
IFFIm’s success in resource mobilization was closely tied to the AAA
credit rating of its bonds at the time of issue. The AAA rating of IFFIm
reflected the fact that governments that were rated AAA accounted for nearly
85 percent of IFFIm donor commitments, and the World Bank was selected
as the treasurer of the funds. The overall level of front-loading was limited
by the management agreement with the World Bank, which required IFFIm
to maintain at least 30 percent of its resources as a financial cushion.30 Since
the 2008 financial crisis, leading IFFIm donors such as France, Spain, Italy,
and the United Kingdom have lost their AAA rating, which has in turn
influenced the credit rating of IFFIm. In 2013, Moody’s Investors Services
downgraded IFFIm to Aa1 with a negative outlook, and other rating firms
have also downgraded the credit rating of IFFIm since the initial offerings.31
A recent evaluation of IFFIm, five years after its launch, found it
relatively successful in accelerating the flow of global health resources, but
less successful in influencing the market for vaccines.32 In terms of resource
mobilization, grant commitments by donors of USD 6.2 billion in legally
binding pledges should enable IFFIm to disburse USD 4.3 billion by 2026.
The low borrowing costs of IFFIm have exceeded initial expectations.
While this innovative mechanism allowed for the front-loading of resources
at relatively low borrowing rates, nearly a third of the committed resources
will service the debt generated under this approach. Although IFFIm has
paid the significant start-up costs required to gain access to funding on the
27

IFFIm Governance, IFFIM, http://www.iffim.org/about/governance/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2015).
GAVI Board, GAVI, http://www.gavialliance.org/about/governance/gavi-board/ (last visited Apr.
28, 2015).
29
PEARSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 64-65
30
Id.
31
Press Release, IFFIm, IFFIm Rating Action by Moody’s Follows UK Downgrade (Mar. 6, 2013),
http://www.iffim.org/library/news/press-releases/2013/iffim-rating-action-by-moodys-follows-ukdowngrade/.
32
See PEARSON ET AL., supra note 21.
28
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financial markets, it does not yet have enough financing to fully take
advantage of those markets.33
Expanding vaccine coverage can be a cost-effective intervention,
because significant positive externalities come from the herd immunity that
results from vaccinating a threshold percentage of a given population.34 In
terms of the vaccine market, accelerating demand has contributed to the
maturity of the market, but IFFIm has not catalyzed a transformation of the
market. It is clear that IFFIm expanded the size of the pentavelent vaccine
market, and thereby contributed to price reductions, but it is less clear that
any broader market impact flowed from the substantial resources of IFFIm.
While IFFIm’s founding documents did not specifically reference any
objective with regard to shaping the the market for vaccines, this dimension
proved to be an important feature of other innovative finance mechanisms
and was a key goal of IFFIm’s implementing partner GAVI.35
Although IFFIm demonstrated the potential for a larger-scale IFF, the
conditions that enabled IFFIm to secure relatively low costs of borrowing
based on the strong credit rating of its core donors have not proven
sustainable. The leadership of the United Kingdom was essential to the
creation of IFFIm but the lack of participation by the United States and other
major donors ultimately limited its scale. The World Bank’s role, while
important in fostering financial credibility for the new enterprise,
constrained the degree of front-loading of the overall resources.36 Among
the keys to IFFIm’s success were the strong commitment by the UK, the
rigorous design process, the credibility of the partnership with the World
Bank, and the strong rating of IFFIm’s bonds.37
B.

UNITAID

The roots of UNITAID can be found in the 2000 Millennium Summit
establishing the MDGs and the 2002 Monterrey Summit on development
financing to achieve the MDGs. At the 2002 Monterrey Summit, French
President Jacques Chirac asked his fellow heads of state to seriously
consider a financial transaction tax as a mechanism to generate resources for
development, but this idea received relatively little support at the time. In
33

Id. at 30-31.
See TODD SANDLER, GLOBAL COLLECTIVE ACTION 105 (2004).
IFFIm Board Response to the IFFIm Evaluaion (June 1, 2011), http://www.iffim.org/Library/
Documents/Evaluations /IFFIm-evaluation--IFFIm-Board-response/.
36
World Bank Response to IFFIm Evaluation (July 1, 2011), http://www.iffim.org/Library/Document
s/Evaluations/IFFIm-evaluation--The-World-Bank-response/ (arguing that the retention of a financial
cushion is a core element of the financial credibility of IFFIm).
37
See PEARSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 33.
34
35
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November 2003, Chirac tasked Jean-Pierre Landau, a long-time French civil
servant, with formally investigating a range of options with respect to
innovative financing. By March 2004, Chirac and his top advisors reflected
on the recommendations of the Landau report and settled on an airline ticket
tax as the best approach.38 They determined that such a mechanism would
be easy to implement, target those with greater discretionary income, and
serve as a symbol of globalization while imposing limited burdens on the air
travel market. Over the next year, Chirac and the President of Brazil, Lula
Da Silva, became the leading champions for the imposition of an airline tax
to help achieve the MDGs.39
The impetus for UNITAID’s focus on the market for drugs for AIDS,
tuberculosis, and malaria came from the French Foreign Minister Philippe
Douste-Blazy. After his appointment in 2005, Douste-Blazy sought advice
from former United States President Bill Clinton about the focus of the
effort. Clinton’s suggestion was to focus on leveraging lower prices for
drugs for AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis through negotiation and volume
discounts.40 Subsequently, Chirac and Lula agreed to create UNITAID as an
international facility for drug purchases, and the United Kingdom joined in
exchange for some of the resources of the French airline tax being used to
support IFFIm.41
UNITAID was designed to collaborate with other leading global
health institutions, including the World Health Organization, the Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, and the Clinton
Foundation.42 The exact details of the implementation of the airline ticket
tax vary from country to country. In France, the tax is one euro for domestic
flights and six euros for international flights in economy class, and ten and
forty euros, respectively, in first class. 43 UNITAID is innovative in its
governance and use of funds as well as its approach to generating resources.
The UNITAID Executive Board consists of twelve members, including the
six leading donor country governments, government representatives from
Asia and Africa, civil society representatives from the global North and
South, a foundation representative, and a representative from the World
38
Interview with President Jacques Chirac About UNITAID, UNITAID, http://www.unitaid.eu/en
/rss-unitaid/1257-interview-with-president-jacques-chirac-about-unitaid (last visited May 16, 2015).
39
PHILIPPE DOUSTE-BLAZY & DANIEL ALTMAN, POWER IN NUMBERS: UNITAID, INNOVATIVE
FINANCING, AND THE QUEST FOR MASSIVE GOOD 23 (2010).
40
Id. at 21-22.
41
Id. at 28-29.
42
Id. at 24.
43
Press Release, French Levy on Airline Tickets Raises More than One Billion Euros for World’s
Poor Since 2006 (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.unitaid.eu/en/resources/press-centre/releases/1125-frenchlevy-on-airline-tickets-raises-more-than-one-billion-euros-for-world-s-poor-since-2006.
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Health Organization.44 The governance of UNITAID reflects a larger role
for diverse stakeholders from the affected populations and countries than in
most innovative financing mechanisms.
The scale of investments by UNITAID opened up space for
negotiating prices with pharmaceutical companies across a range of diseases.
One example of market innovation is the Affordable Medicines Facility,
which pays bulk subsidies to the manufacturers of antimalarials in order to
facilitate low-cost purchases by consumers in low-income countries.
Through this facility, UNITAID has successfully helped bring down the cost
of leading malaria treatments, such as artemisinin. 45 UNITAID also
contributed to developing new pediatric anti-retroviral formulations for HIV,
new pediatric tuberculosis treatments, and to significantly lowering prices
for drugs against HIV/AIDS and multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis. 46
UNITAID is distinctive among most major innovative financing
mechanisms in that it does not rely on donor governments to either directly
supply or guarantee its resource flow.47
The role of UNITAID in re-shaping the market for drugs reflects the
innovative nature of its governance structure. In the view of Douste-Blazy,
the balanced representation of both donors and affected populations has been
a crucial feature. 48 More specifically, he cites the involvement of NGO
representatives who were unwilling to accept anything less than an approach
designed around the potential for significant market impact as critical to the
ultimate success of UNITAID: “Like Bill Clinton, [Northern NGO
representative] Elouardighi was convinced that UNITAID had to be
innovative in its spending as well as its fund-raising . . . [and declared that]
‘we set up UNITAID to have a market impact on drugs. . . . As a board
member, I am going to refuse all the programs without market impact.’” 49
UNITAID has been successful, both in resource mobilization and in
its strategy of limited but leveraged market interventions. By 2011, nine
countries had imposed some form of tax on air tickets to support UNITAID.
This mechanism accounted for approximately 61 percent of total UNITAID

44

Executive Board, UNITAID, http://www.unitaid.eu/governance-mainmenu-4/executive-boardmainmenu-33?task=view&id=35 (last visited Apr. 26, 2015).
45
See generally Suerie Moon et al., Focusing on Quality Patient Care in the New Global Subsidy for
Malaria Medicines, 6 PLOS MED (2009), available at http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=
10.1371/journal.pmed.1000106#s1.
46
DOUSTE-BLAZY & ALTMAN, supra note 39, at 121.
47
Id. at 45.
48
Id. at 115.
49
Id. at 37-38.

504

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 24 NO. 3

resources and generated USD 1.48 billion for UNITAID.50 An evaluation of
UNITAD, five years later, validated UNITAID’s approach of engaging in
limited interventions with significant market impact in key markets for
essential medicines. The evaluation found that: “UNITAID has been doing
the right things to contribute to significant positive outcomes in the fight
against the three diseases . . . . UNITAID has validated its business model of
identifying, selecting, and funding market-shaping interventions carried out
by implementing partners.” 51 UNITAID’s substantial contribution reflects
not only the leadership of the French government, but also important early
strategic decisions during the design stage of the initiative, including the
incorporation of diverse stakeholders in its governance structure.
C.

Advanced Market Commitment

The genesis of the Advanced Market Commitment (“AMC”) began
with the work of economist Michael Kremer of Harvard University. 52
Kremer and his co-authors wrote about the potential for long-term contracts
financed by donors to create incentives for the research and development
needed to develop vaccines for low-income countries. 53 Seeking to
demonstrate leadership on development, the Italian government
commissioned the Tremonti Report analyzing the concept of the AMC in
2005.54 The report raised the level of interest among other nations, and the
G8 ultimately agreed to explore the feasibility of the idea. The first
technical meeting of the AMC took place in Rome in 2006, and a pilot
project focused on the pneumococcal vaccine was soon agreed upon.
Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, Russia, and the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation formally launched the AMC in February 2007.
The donors committed to provide USD 1.5 billion in order to guarantee a
market for the pneumococcal vaccine in low-income countries.55 The choice
of the pneumococcal vaccine was based on the existence of a vaccine in an
advanced stage of production that could demonstrate results quickly, as well
50

About UNITAID, UNITAID, http://www.unitaid.eu/en/who/about-unitaid (last visited May 15,

2015).
51

See UNITAID, 5-YEAR EVALUATION SUMMARY 1 (2012).
See Ernst R. Berndt et al., Advanced Market Commitments for Vaccines Against Neglected
Diseases: Estimating Costs and Effectiveness, 16 HEALTH ECON. 491 (2007).
53
See id.
54
See Minister of the Economy and Finance (Italy), Report to the G8 Finance Ministers, Advanced
Market Commitments for Vaccines: A New Tool in the Fight Against Disease and Poverty (Dec. 2, 2005),
http://www.innovativefinanceoslo.no/pop.cfm?FuseAction=Doc&p%20Action=View&pDocumentId=1152
9.
55
Donald W. Light, Advanced Market Commitments: Current Realities and Alternate Approaches,
HAI EUROPE/MEDICO INTERNATIONAL PAPER SERIES, ref. no. 03-2009/01, 2009, at 2.
52

JUNE 2015

INNOVATIVE FINANCING

505

as the fact that it is one of the largest vaccine preventable killers of children
under five. Before the AMC, the pneumococcal vaccine was essentially a
product for developed nations, which did not necessarily cover the strains of
the disease that were most prevalent in low-income countries. However, the
architects of the AMC did not clearly establish the relative priority of the
longer-term market incentive role of the mechanisms versus the near-term
capacity to implement a successful global health initiative. The seven week
timeline for the selection of a target disease for the AMC very likely pushed
the process toward the selection of a late-stage vaccine for which better
quality data was available. 56 The expert committee, despite strong
representation from developing country governments, was largely limited to
health officials with less of a background or focus on the market
transforming potential of the AMC.57
In May 2007, the AMC Donor Committee, consisting of the founding
donors, created an independent Economic Expert Group.58 The Economic
Expert Group consisted largely of academic economists to devise options for
implementing the model. AMC’s ultimate design provided that each
manufacturer would receive a share of the committed financing in
proportion to its supply commitment.
Two leading pharmaceutical
manufacturers, Pfizer and GlaxoSmithKline, agreed to supply 60 million
doses over ten years. The advanced contract provided that the first 20
percent of each manufacturer’s supply would be priced at USD 7 per dose,
while the remaining 80 percent would be priced at USD 3.50 per dose.
Based on the recommendations of the GAVI Expert Economic Group, the
pricing level was intended to ensure a commercially viable market and to
foster greater competition.59 The costs were designed to be shared between
GAVI, which received the AMC funding, and recipient countries on a per
capita basis. While the legally binding commitments on donor pledges were
important to building confidence among manufacturers, these legal
guarantees remained relatively weak and did not come close to covering all
of the resources needed to fully implement the AMC.60
The AMC had significant long-term financial repercussions for GAVI.
In order to cover the cost of the AMC, GAVI needed to raise more overall
resources than were ultimately contributed by the donors that launched the
56
See VERONICA CHAU ET AL., DALBERG GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT ADVISORS, THE ADVANCED
MARKET COMMITMENT FOR PNEUMOCOCCAL VACCINES: PROCESS AND DESIGN EVALUATION 30 (2013).
57
Id.
58
Pneumococcal AMC Timeline, GAVI, http://www.gavi.org/funding/pneumococcal-amc/timeline/
(last visited May 16, 2015).
59
See Donald Light, Saving Pneumococcal AMC and GAVI, 7 HUMAN VACCINES 138, 139 (2011).
60
CHAU ET AL., supra note 56, at 69.
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AMC.61 Critics such as Oxfam argue that the vaccines targeted by the AMC
could have been acquired more cheaply through existing UNICEF
procedures to purchase vaccines for developing countries. 62 Nonetheless,
the Chair of GAVI’s board explained that “GAVI would stick to its
commitments under the AMC deal, but would in the future look at ways of
getting better value.”63
Although originally viewed as a mechanism to incentivize the
development of new vaccines, the market impact of the AMC is more
difficult to assess given the fact that the pneumococcal vaccine was already
in existence before the launch of the initiative. The AMC targeting
pneumococcal did catalyze a significant price reduction from the price
established for developed countries for the vaccine. However, given that the
research and development costs of vaccine manufacturers would already be
recouped in the developed country market, the current AMC seems closer to
a surplus contract than a research incentive scheme.
While the AMC accelerated the uptake of the pneumococcal vaccine
in low-income countries, it remains less clear whether the AMC was
necessary to catalyze pharmaceutical firms to enter this market in the first
place.64 According to an independent evaluation of the AMC, one major
pharmaceutical manufacturer was planning to establish a large-scale plant in
Singapore to produce the vaccine for low-income countries even before the
announcement of the initiative. However, other firms seem to have decided
to enter this marketplace only after the AMC announcement.65 One recent
study of innovative financing suggests that: “It is impossible to know if the
opportunity to provide the vaccines to millions of people . . . would have
been enough to entice low cost manufacturers to participate without the
advance guarantee that vaccine would be purchased.”66
While the counterfactual is difficult to analyze, the experience of
GAVI’s efforts with other vaccines suggests that the AMC may not have
been essential to achieving this outcome. For example, the market for
pentavalent vaccine became relatively competitive, with six manufacturers
building research programs and gaining pre-qualification from the World
Health Organization, without any advanced purchase commitments.
61
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However, these vaccine purchases were backed by the resource guarantees
of IFFIm, and the pentavalent vaccine is simpler to manufacture and requires
a smaller initial investment than the PCV vaccine.67 Nonetheless, it seems
quite plausible that at least some of the efficiencies in terms of pricing and
the predictability of expanded manufacturing capacity could have been
achieved without the long-term commitments of the AMC, which locked-in
pricing and limited the future bargaining power of GAVI with leading
manufacturers.
III.

EXPLAINING THE EVOLUTION AND IMPACT OF INNOVATIVE FINANCING

UNITAID, IFFIm, and the AMC share a common catalyst, but each
evolved in quite different ways that reflect the important role of path
dependence in shaping innovative financing for development.
The
expansion of innovative financing for global health over the last decade
reflects the influence of the MDGs and the incentives for donor countries to
achieve these goals through innovative financing mechanisms. Even as
formal United Nations processes drove much of the MDG agenda, G8
countries proved to be among the most important champions for launching
innovative finance mechanisms for global health. Ultimately, the specific
architecture of each mechanism depended a great deal on the range of state
and non-state actors who participated in the process of design and
governance.
In the wake of the 2005 Gleneagles commitments by the G8 to
increase development financing, there was significant additional pressure on
national governments to identify alternative approaches to meet these
commitments. 68 Although France and the United Kingdom were the
competitive actors in promoting innovative finance mechanisms, both
countries ultimately realized that their initiatives were much less likely to
succeed without the participation of the other. While strong incentives
existed for individual G8 governments to get credit for promoting specific
innovative finance mechanisms, each national champion sought the
legitimacy of formal G8 endorsement and the participation of a range of
non-G8 governments in order to demonstrate broad international support.69
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Although these three innovative finance mechanisms share common
roots, their specific approaches reflected the different national champions of
each mechanism. The Landau report on innovative financing options
commissioned by French President Jacques Chirac highlighted taxation
mechanisms as among the most viable approaches. Both Chirac and his
successor, Nicolas Sarkozy, shared a strong interest in implementing a
broader financial transactions tax to support development financing. Chirac
and his advisors quickly settled on the more modest airline ticket tax as a
mechanism that would be consistent with these broader global taxation
ambitions, while also having a limited impact on the national budget. By
contrast, the United Kingdom, which spearheaded the Gleneagles
commitments on development assistance and is home to a leading financial
center, was more willing to expand its domestic budget investments in
development financing, more eager to leverage private market financing, and
more reluctant to support new forms of taxation. Meanwhile, Italy, with
much more limited resources devoted to traditional development assistance,
sought to promote a model that had already gained currency among some
leading development economists and held the potential for a leveraged
impact from finite donor financing over a relatively long time period.
These three national champions continue to be the leading financial
supporters of each of these innovative financing mechanisms. IFFIm is now
on track to generate USD 6.3 billion in resources by 2030.70 UNITAID has
already raised USD 2.2 billion, of which over USD 1.4 billion was generated
through the airline levy. 71 With UNITAID, France alone has raised over
USD 1.2 billion, Spain has raised USD 81 million, and Brazil has raised
USD 37 million.72 The AMC catalyzed donor commitments of USD 1.5
billion and has so far led to actual contributions of just under USD 1 billion
and disbursements of over USD 850 million. 73 With the AMC, Italy
committed USD 685 million, while the United Kingdom committed USD
485 million, Canada committed USD 200 billion, and all other donors
committed less than USD 100 million.74
The specific architecture and design of each mechanism depended a
great deal on the range of stakeholders that participated in the design process
and the governance structure. The French ultimately embraced a multistakeholder governance model for UNITAID, including diverse civil society
70
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actors and developing country governments; the board of IFFIm consists of
finance experts; and the design of the AMC was shaped by its major donors
and select groups of experts. Both the IFFIm and the AMC, in selecting
GAVI as the core partner for implementation, had some links to a multistakeholder governance structure. Yet, in contrast with the UNITAID
governance model, GAVI’s board involves non-state actors as independent
individuals even as it has representatives from the vaccine industry, research
institutes, foundations, and NGOs.75
While the rise of innovative financing over the last decade reflects a
broader shift in norms tied to the launch of the Millennium Development
Goals, the evolution of each specific mechanism reveals the important role
of state sponsors and non-state actors. The innovative financing model in
the context of global health strongly reflected the initial visions of founding
governments, and these early decisions continued to shape the evolution of
these institutions over time. While states remain the central actors in
catalyzing the launch of innovative financing mechanisms, non-state actors
are no less important in influencing the ultimate trajectory of these
initiatives.
While UNITAID includes affected populations in its governance
structure, IFFIm and the AMC rely much more heavily on experts to shape
the strategic direction of the initiatives. With IFFIm, expertise within the
finance industry was central to its design and implementation; with the
AMC, experts in health and economics were each given important roles at
different stages. These different models have important implications for the
ultimate impact of each mechanism in terms of market impact.
In the case of UNITAID, the involvement of affected groups and other
non-state actors significantly influenced the focus of the initiative on
shaping the market for essential medicines.76 Although officials within the
French government shaped the adoption of a tax on airline tickets as the
central financing mechanism, non-state actors strongly influenced the
innovative approach to the pharmaceutical market. Initial conversations
with the leadership of the Clinton Foundation suggested focusing on
medicines for AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, and the persistent role of
civil society board members contributed to UNITAID’s consistent focus on
its ultimate market impact across these three diseases.77
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By contrast, the finance officials on the IFFIm board proved to be
ingenious at identifying low bond spreads in the Japanese markets but were
much less interested in the ways in which front-loaded financing might reshape vaccine markets. The AMC is a somewhat confusing case since the
initial premise was to create powerful incentives for research and
development for new vaccines but the pressures of G8 decision-making led
to a focus on a vaccine that already existed.78 As a result, the AMC had a
much more limited impact on re-shaping vaccine markets than originally
anticipated, and the potential of the original idea of incentivizing vaccine
development remains largely untested.
The three innovative financing mechanisms also have profoundly
different financial implications in the medium to long run. The airline ticket
tax, which UNITAID utilized, appears to be the most sustainable of the three
financing mechanisms because it relies on a relatively steady stream of
individual consumer transactions. However, this approach is not necessarily
as predictable as some of the other mechanisms since it depends on a
potentially fluctuating level of air travel. By contrast, IFFIm is proving to be
the most predictable of these innovative financing mechanisms but it is far
from sustainable. In fact, the front-loading of IFFIm has already peaked,
and the debt servicing on IFFIm bonds will outweigh the resources it
generates for GAVI over the decade to come. 79 In addition, the unique
conditions, which enabled IFFIm to succeed on the bond markets, are no
longer present. Amidst weakening bond ratings for both IFFIm and key
donor governments, this model does not appear to be quite as sustainable in
periods of heightened economic uncertainty. Finally, the AMC seems to be
quite predictable in specifying advanced contracts with vaccine
manufacturers, but this very predictability is becoming a significant financial
liability for GAVI. The initial donor contributions, which catalyzed the
AMC, fell far short of the overall costs of the arrangement.80 Although a
lower price for the vaccines might be possible today, the lock-in effect of the
advanced contract is a significant downside for GAVI as prices continue to
decline.81
The most successful of these innovative financing mechanisms seem
to be the most automatic and the most participatory. The airline ticket tax,
once implemented, does not depend on the future actions of national
78
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governments to generate resources. By contrast, even the binding
commitments involved in IFFIm and the AMC ultimately require national
governments to fulfill their commitments. More participatory approaches to
designing and governing innovative financing seem to foster better outcomes
in terms of the market impact of these financing mechanisms. The expertled model of the AMC design did not achieve the level of market impact of
the multi-stakeholder model utilized by UNITAID. While there are certainly
other important differences in the underlying mechanisms that contributed to
this result, there is evidence that the participation by affected groups was
important in shaping the ultimate market impact of UNITAID. Table 1
highlights the diverse models of innovative financing and governance of
each of these mechanisms. Additionally, it highlights the impact of each in
terms of the predictability and sustainability of financing, as well as in terms
of ultimate market impact:
Table 1
MECHANISM

IFFIm (2006)

UNITAID (2006)

AMC (2007)

MODEL

Bond

Tax

Contract

GOVERNANCE

Expert

Multi-Stakeholder

Expert

FINANCING

Predictable

Sustainable

Predictable

MARKET IMPACT

Medium

High

Low

IV.

IMPLICATIONS
GOALS

FOR

FINANCING

THE

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

As negotiation of the final Sustainable Development Goals is
accelerating, the challenge of financing these ambitious goals is catalyzing
renewed interest in a range of innovative financing mechanisms. A High
Level Task Force on Innovative Financing for Health, including World Bank
President Robert Zoellick and Gordon Brown, issued recommendations for
expanding existing financing mechanisms. The report called for the
expansion of UNITAID and IFFIm, the extension of the airline ticket tax to
more countries, the possible expansion of the mandate of IFFIm, and further
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investigation into the viability of levies on tobacco and currency transactions.
Amidst declining donor commitments to overseas development assistance
(“ODA”), some commentators have cynically viewed these latest efforts as a
response by governments failing to meet their ODA obligations. 82
Nonetheless, as national budgets continue to tighten, innovative approaches
are generating greater interest. 83 Lessons from the experience of global
health financing over the last decade can contribute to a better assessment of
these recent proposals and offer some guidance on the direction of
innovative financing for development.
Among the most important features of these innovative financing
mechanisms are the sustainability of financing and the breadth of
participation in the governance of these initiatives. While the challenge of
achieving the MDGs has highlighted the significance of ensuring both
predictable and sustainable development financing, innovative financing
mechanisms that promise sustainable approaches are likely to be more
effective in the long run. Predictability can take many forms and can
sometimes pose a constraint on innovation and learning. The predictability
of accelerated financing under IFFIm came with a long tail of debt financing,
which will limit GAVI’s ability to incorporate lessons from its initial
implementation efforts. Similarly, the predictability of advanced contracting
under the AMC limits the potential for capturing the savings from
accelerating declines in drug pricing over time.
Amidst growing donor fatigue in the wake of the financial crisis, the
sustainability of development financing will be even more crucial over the
next decade. Although the revenue generated from the airline ticket tax can
fluctuate in relation to the economy, the automatic nature of the mechanism
and its relative independence from the annual budget process of donor
countries ensure greater sustainability. Automatic mechanisms that do not
rely on domestic cross-pressures and fragile donor commitments are likely
to become even more important to future efforts at development financing.
No less important than the sustainability of innovative financing
mechanisms is the structure of governance of these initiatives. Based on
these three mechanisms, the more participatory models seem to demonstrate
more promising market impact than the less participatory models, which rely
more heavily on expertise and offer more limited roles for affected
82
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populations. The NGO representatives on UNITAID’s board proved to be
forceful and effective advocates for the institution becoming an aggressive
player in reshaping the markets for medicines. The less participatory
approaches to governance within IFFIm and the AMC contributed to a more
limited focus on the potential long-term market impact of these mechanisms.
It is quite possible that a more participatory design process might have led
the AMC to focus on spurring the development of an earlier stage vaccine of
the type that the mechanism was originally designed to incentivize.
Applying these insights from the experience of innovative financing
for health suggests that a broader bond-financed IFF for development
financing may prove challenging. A broader IFF faces major obstacles
because the leading governments behind IFFIm no longer hold the stellar
credit ratings that they once did, so the cost of borrowing could be much
greater. In addition, the potential benefits of accelerated financing under a
broader IFF would still not address the lack of sustainability in this model of
innovative development financing. However, the IFF is but one model of
bond financing. More decentralized approaches, including supporting
municipal bond offerings, may prove more attractive in the context of
financing the SDGs.
At least as important as the overall model of financing is the approach
to the design and governance of innovative mechanisms and the extent to
which diverse stakeholders are involved.
The more participatory
governance structure of UNITAID contributed to its success in reshaping the
market of medicines for AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. UNITAID
contributed to the development of new pediatric anti-retroviral formulations
and tuberculosis treatments, to dramatic price cuts in the cost of medicines
for AIDS and tuberculosis, and to greater efficiencies in the supply of antimalaria medicines.84 By contrast, IFFIm had a much smaller impact on the
vaccine market relative to its overall resources, and the AMC fell short of its
potential to catalyze the development of important new vaccines.
The apparent relationship between participation and the success of
innovative financing mechanisms is consistent with research on recently
created vertical funds in the area of development financing. More
independent, more participatory, and more performance-based vertical funds
are outperforming the less independent, less participatory, and less
performance-based vertical funds on the dimensions of resource
mobilization, learning, and impact. Less-independent institutions are less
likely to involve non-state actors in governance and participation seems to
84

DOUSTE-BLAZY & ALTMAN, supra note 39, at 121.

514

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 24 NO. 3

play an important role in shaping resource mobilization and effective
implementation at the country level. 85
The significance of participation for innovative financing also extends
to the feedback mechanisms and potential for learning within this new
generation of institutions. Recent studies highlight the ways in which
openness to the participation of diverse stakeholders can contribute to
furthering deliberation in the process of institutional decision-making.
Involving civil society actors in the process of agenda setting is an important
feature of this pattern within international institutions, but no less important
are the mechanisms for continuous feedback, the involvement of local
contextual knowledge in implementation, and peer review. 86 Despite the
requirement of independent five-year evaluations for each of the three
innovative finance mechanisms examined, there are not yet the type of
continuous feedback mechanisms that would contribute to institutional
learning.
Expanded participation within innovative financing mechanisms also
responds to concerns about the overall accountability of development
financing institutions. 87 Scholars examining the accountability of
international institutions have identified “hybrid intergovernmental-private
administration” as an increasingly important form of global administration in
which non-governmental actors participate alongside government
representatives in standard-setting. 88 With the growing role of non-state
actors in the governance of development financing and international
institutions more generally, identifying the mechanisms which foster greater
accountability within the context of multi-stakeholder governance will be
increasingly important to the future of development financing.89
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CONCLUSION

The growth of innovative financing for development over the last
decade has demonstrated the enormous potential of new mechanisms for
generating resources beyond traditional official development assistance. In
the global health sector, diverse approaches to innovative finance among
different institutions provide a window into the relative merits of approaches
that rely on taxation, bonds, and advanced contract arrangements. The
experience of IFFIm, UNITAID, and the AMC offer broader insights into
the importance of sustainability and participation in ensuring the success of
innovative finance mechanisms and the potential for innovative financing to
contribute to realizing the SDGs.
Although none of these innovative approaches would have been
established without the catalyst of the Millennium Development Goals and
the leading role of members of the G8, the ultimate direction and success of
each reflected the diversity of the non-state actors involved in the process
and the level of independence of these financing mechanism from reliance
upon traditional donor financing commitments. Greater sustainability is
easier to achieve with automatic mechanisms that generate resources
regardless of whether donors fulfil their financing commitments. Greater
market impact appears to be more likely when affected populations are
included in the design and governance of innovative financing mechanisms.
Further research is needed to better assess how well these lessons
from first generation innovative financing efforts translate into the diverse
types of investments required to achieve the SDGs. While it is plausible that
sustainability and participation will remain important variables in the
success of innovative financing, the relative importance of these dimensions
may well be contingent on the capacities and the incentives of the state and
non-state actors involved in a given sector. As resources are often fungible,
new approaches to innovative financing in support of the Sustainable
Development Goals will face the twin challenges of ensuring that new
resources are, in fact, additional amidst tightening donor funding, and
maintaining a sustainable development focus when the very success of these
financing models invites significant competition over scarce resources.

